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Salvation in Section 83

26 USC § 83 will be your favorite statute in all of the U.S. Code once you understand it.  

Look it up, and it’s a bit of the normal convoluted legalese that you would expect but this is what it boils down to…

In short, Section 83 of the Internal Revenue Code itself is very clear and specific in saying, in essence, that any amount which is considered fair market value which is received as compensation for services (i.e. wages, labor, contract services, etc.) is NOT considered ‘Gross Income subject to Subtitle A Income Taxes’.  The courts have agreed repeatedly.  The manual which is included in the IRS FREEDOM package is an exhaustive research guide bringing together a mountain of supporting case law and analysis.  Understand the law.  Just follow the law, and make sure those who are involved in your finances follow the law and everything works just fine.

We incorporate this into our documentation in the NOTICE OF OFFER OF PERFORMANCE and the FILING STATEMENT in the IRS FREEDOM PACKAGE to make the documentation basically a MIRV.  Multiple Intercontinental Re-entry Vehicle delivering legal warheads to destroy all legal resources which the enemy may have and obliterate him off the map as it relates to ‘the’ S.S. account they want to attach to you! 

Further, the research below is only a sample of what you’ll get in the manual:  CODE BREAKER: The Section 83 Equation, by David Myrland, which you can find at David’s website



Do not order the package from this page because it’s already included in your membership in the ADVANCED TRAINING LIBRARIES.  The page is only for reference and overview, informational purposes.

Tax Code § 83 applies to any and all compensation for personal services actually performed:

Cohn v. C.I.R., 73 USTC 443, 446 (1979): “Petitioners rest their entire case on the proposition that Elovich and Cohn and/or Mega were “independent contractors” and not employees of the Integrated and that, therefore, section 83 does not apply to the acquisition of the shares from Integrated. They rely on the legislative history surrounding the statute to support their proposition that section 83 was intended to apply only to restricted stock transferred to employees. Respondent contends that the words “any person” in section 83(a) encompass independent contractors as well as employees. We agree with Respondent. . . . We reject petitioner’s argument. While restricted stock plans involving employers and employees may have been the primary impetus behind the enactment of section 83, the language of the section covers the transfer of any property transferred in connection with the performance of services “to any person other than the person for whom the services are performed.” (Emphasis added.) The legislative history makes clear that Congress was aware that the statute’s coverage extended beyond restricted stock plans for employees. H.Rept. 91-413 (Part 1) (1969), 1969-3 C.B. 200, 255; S.Rept. 91-552 (1969), 1969-3 C.B. 423, 501. The regulations state that that section 83 applies to employees and independent contractors (sec. 1.83-1(a), Income Tax Regs.). There is no question but that, under the foregoing circumstances, these regulations are not “unreasonably and plainly inconsistent with the revenue statutes.” Consequently, they are sustained. (cites omitted)” 
Pledger v. C.I.R., 641 F.2d 287, 293 (CA5 1981): “The taxing scheme imposed by Congress more accurately reflects what taxpayer received as compensation than a scheme that taxes the taxpayer on merely a portion of the compensation.” 

Alves v. C.I.R., 734 F.2d 478, 481 (CA9 1984): “The plain language of section 83(a) belies Alve’s argument. Section 83(a) applies to all property transferred in connection with the performance of services. No reference is made to the term “compensation.” Nor is there any statutory requirement that property have a fair market value in excess of the amount paid at the time of transfer. Indeed, if Congress had intended section 83(a) to apply solely to restricted stock used to compensate its employees, it could have used much narrower language. Indeed, Congress made section 83(a) applicable to all restricted “property,” not just stock; to property transferred to “any person,” not just to employees; and to property transferred “in connection with . . . services,” not just compensation for employment. See Cohn v. Commissioner, 73 USTC 443, 446-47 (1979).” 

Robinson v. C.I.R., 82 USTC 444, 459 (1984); “The legislative history of section 83 does not require the conclusion that the statute should be applied to tax-avoidance techniques only. To the contrary, the House and Senate reports specifically delineate transactions and transfers to which section 83 was not to apply and do not exclude from its purview contractual provisions that were not tax motivated.” 

MacNaughton v. C.I.R., 888 F.2d 418, 421 (CA6 1989): “The Alves court stated that the plain language of section 83 belied this argument because the “statute applied to all property transferred in connection with the performance of services” and because no reference is made to the term “compensation.” Id. The court further concluded in Alves that “if Congress had intended section 83(a) to apply solely to restricted stock used to compensate employees, it could have used much narrower language.” Id. at 481-82. Upon consideration, we agree with the interpretation advanced by the Alves court and, therefore, join the Ninth Circuit in holding that section 83 is not limited to stock transfers which are compensatory in nature.” 

*Concurring with CohnAlves, see Centel Communications Co. v. CIR, 920 F.2d 1335, 1342 (CA7 1990). 

Klingler Electric Co. v. C.I.R., 776 F.Supp. 1158, 1164 at [1] (S.D.Miss. 1991): “Section 83(a) applies to all property transferred in connection with the performance of services.” 

Montelepre Systemed, Inc. v. C.I.R., 956 F.2d 496, 498 at [1] (CA5 1992): “Section 83(a) explains how property received in exchange for services is taxed.” 

Gudmundsson v. US, 634 F.3d 212 (CA2 2011): “At the heart of this case is I.R.C. § 83, which governs the taxation of property transferred in connection with the performance of services.”

Section 83 provides for the determination of the amount to be included in gross income and the timing of the inclusion when property is transferred to an employee or independent contractor in connection with the performance of services.” (See IRS Revenue Ruling 2007-19, IRS’ Office of Associate Chief Counsel (Procedure & Administration), Administrative Provisions and Judicial Practice Division, 2007).” 

IRS Officer, Sue Besson, 20 yrs. on the job who performed over 500 investigations, on the stand in the tax evasion trial of Raymond Gebauer, August of 2007: “I am unfamiliar with § 83.” 

The Supreme Court says:

[W]e have referred to the Court of Appeals when enquiring whether a right was “clearly established.” “

See United States v. Lanier, 520 US 259, 269, 137 L.Ed.2d 432, 117 S.Ct. 1219 (1997) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 427 US 511, 533, 86 L.Ed.2d 411, 105 S.Ct. 2806 (1985); Davis v. Scherer, 468 US 183, 191-92, 82 L.Ed.2d. 139, 104 S.Ct. 3012 (1984); Elder v. Halloway, 510 US 510, 516, 127 L.Ed.2d 344, 114 S.Ct. 1019 (1994) (treating Court of Appeals decisions as “relevant authority” that must be considered as part of qualified immunity enquiry)). 

“[E]ach section of the Internal Revenue Code is not a self contained whole, but rather a building block of a complex, interrelated statute.” (See Hartman v. Comm’r IRS, 65 TC 542, 545 (1975)). 

          Because § 83 is universally applicable to any and all compensation, I have no choice but to comply with it when I calculate my income tax liability. More importantly, the IRS has the same obligation. 


Authorities relative to the interpretation of Tax Code § 83(a):

Labor is property, and its value is determined through the terms of an arm’s length transaction:

Labor is the most sacred property and inviolable right of man.

“The authorities we have cited show that labor is a doom, and if submitted to with fidelity, secures a blessing to the human familyThe obligation to labor being imperious, confers a right to labor, which right is property; and it cannot be withdrawn or destroyed by arbitrary legislation without a violation of natural right. This right is a social right, and constitutions have been made to secure it from invasion. No State of the American Union can deprive a man of his title by arbitrary edict; and arbitrary institutions to limit, depress, impair or to take away this right, cannot be favored or maintained. …And it is of profound regret to me that its validity is recognized by a majority of this Court, for by it the right to free labor, one of the most sacred and imprescriptible rights of man, is violated.” Slaughterhouse, 16 Wall. 36-130 (1872). “Among these inalienable rights, as proclaimed in that document [Dec. of Independence.], is the right of men to pursue their happiness, by which is meant the right to pursue any lawful business or vocation, in any manner not inconsistent with the equal rights of others, which may increase their prosperity or develop their faculties, so as to give their highest enjoyment.
          “The common business and callings of life, the ordinary trades and pursuits, which are innocuous in themselves, and have been followed in all communities from time immemorial, must, therefore, be free in this country to all alike upon the same conditions. The right to pursue them, without let or hindrance, except that which is applied to all persons of the same age, sex, condition, is a distinguished privilege of citizens of the United States, and an essential element of that freedom which they claim as their birthright.
          “It has been well said that, the property which every man has is his own labor, as it is the original foundation of all other property, so it is the most sacred and inviolable. The patrimony of the poor man lies in the strength and dexterity of his own hands, and to hinder his employing this strength and dexterity in what manner he thinks proper, without injury to his neighbor, is a plain violation of the most sacred property.” 

See Butcher’s Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746 (1883). And – 

The fair market value is the price at which the property would change hands between a wiling buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts.” Treas.Reg. §20.2031-1(b). The willing buyer-willing seller test of fair market value is nearly as old as the federal income, estate, and gift taxes themselves, and is not challenged here.” 
          ” . . .The ‘willing buyer’ is the fully informed person who agrees to buy . . . at the redemption price. . . . It is a market made up of informed buyers and informed sellers, all dealing at arm’s length.” 

See U.S. v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 551 (1973). And – 

Fair market value is that “price which would probably agreed upon by a seller willing, but under no compulsion, to sell, and a buyer willing, but under no compulsion, to buy, where both have reasonable knowledge of the facts.”   – See Pledger v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 641 F.2d 287, 295 (CA5 1981), quoting Newberry, 39 BTA 1123 (1939). And – 
          Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Edition, “Arm’s length transaction.” Said of a transaction negotiated between unrelated parties, each acting in his or her own self interest; the basis for a fair market value determination. A transaction in good faith in the ordinary course of business by parties with independent interests . . . The standard under which unrelated parties, each acting in his or her own best interest, would carry out a particular transaction. 

          From my employer, from my customer, from my client, who are unrelated parties who pay me in arm’s length transactions for my personal services, I receive fees, commissions, tips, salaries, vacation pay, sick pay, medical benefits, dental benefits, company car, a pension, all things paid in connection with the performance of my services under the contract governing my obligations to the one purchasing my services. 


When the law says “any” or “any property” it’s construed as all inclusive

          As used in statute and regulation, the terms “any” or “any property” are to be construed as all inclusive until express statutory exceptions can be cited to support a contention that such terms are not all inclusive. (See U.S. v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 607-611 and (syllabus) (1989); United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350, 357 (1994); U.S. v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 4-6 (1997); Department of Housing and Urban Renewal v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 130-31 (2002) citing Gonzalez and Monsanto (ALL FOUR decisions in .pdf format here)). 

1989 – Monsanto: Heroin manufacturer Monsanto argues that he should be allowed to keep enough money for attorney’s fees, but the DOJ argues successfully that “any property” is all inclusive and therefore means the U.S. can seize any and all property unless Monsanto can point to a specific exclusion of attorney’s fees under the law. DOJ can seize everything owned by defendant. 
1994 – Alvarez: U.S. argues successfully that, because statute expressly provides for an exception to “any,” that it is not all inclusive, that a “delay” should not preclude a criminal defendant’s confession or statement to state police from being used as evidence in federal case commenced thereafter. DOJ can use confession sought to be suppressed by criminal defendant. 

1997 – Gonzales: U.S. argues successfully that “any” in sentencing laws is all inclusive and therefore prevents the defendants from serving federal time concurrently with other sentences, argues for more jail time and gets it. More jail time for convict. 

2002 – Rucker (citing Monsanto and Gonzales): U.S. argues successfully that “innocent owner” defense unavailable to co-tenant of low income housing who, although innocent, was subject to the statute’s eviction of an all inclusive “any tenant” of a leased unit where prohibited activity had taken place. U.S. can evict the innocent tenant of low income housing unit which is scene of prohibited behavior. 

And from MonsantoId.

“Section 853’s language is plain and unambiguous. Congress could not have chosen stronger words to express its intent that forfeiture be mandatory than § 853(a)’s language that upon conviction a person “shall forfeit . . . any property” and that the sentencing court “shall order” a forfeiture. Likewise, the statute provides a broad definition of property which does not even hint at the idea that assets used for attorney’s fees are not includedEvery Court of Appeals that has finally passed on this argument has agreed with this viewNeither the Act’s legislative history nor legislators’ post-enactment statements support respondent’s argument that an exception should be created because the statute does not expressly include property to be used for attorney’s fees, or because Congress simply did not consider the prospect that forfeiture would reach such property. . . . Moreover, respondent’s admonition that courts should construe statutes to avoid decision as to their constitutionality is not license for the judiciary to rewrite statutory language. Pp. 606-611.” 

In determining the scope of a statute, we look first to its language.” United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981). In the case before us, the language of § 853 is plain and unambiguous: all assets falling within its scope are to be forfeited upon conviction, with no exception existing for the assets used to pay attorney’s fees — or anything else, for that matter

          As observed above, § 853(a) provides that a person convicted of the offenses charged in respondent’s indictment “shall forfeit . . . any property” that was derived from the commission of these offenses. After setting out this rule, § 853(a) repeats later in its text that upon conviction a sentencing court “shall order” forfeiture of all property described in § 853(a). Congress could not have chosen stronger words to express its intent that forfeiture be mandatory in cases where the statute applied, or broader words to define the scope of what was to be forfeited. Likewise, the statute provides a broad definition of “property” when describing what types of assets are within the section’s scope: “real property . . . tangible and intangible personal property, including rights, privileges, interests, claims, and securities.” 21 U.S.C. § 853(b) (1982 ed., Supp.V). Nothing in this all-inclusive listing even hints at the idea that assets to be used to pay an attorney are not “property” within the statute’s meaning
Nor are we alone in concluding that the statute is unambiguous in failing to exclude assets that could be used to pay an attorney from its definition of forfeitable property. This argument, advanced by respondent here, see Brief for Respondent 12-19, has been unanimously rejected by every Court of Appeals that has finally passed on it, as it was by the Second Circuit panel below, see 836 F.2d at 78-80; id. at 85-86 (Oakes, J., dissenting); even the judges who concurred on statutory grounds in the en banc decision did not accept this position, see 852 F.2d at 1405-1410 (Winter, J., concurring). We note also that the Brief for American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae 6, frankly admits that the statute “on [its] face, broadly cover[s] all property derived from alleged criminal activity and contain[s] no specific exemption for property used to pay bona fide attorneys’ fees.” 
Respondent urges us, nonetheless, to interpret the statute to exclude such property for several reasons. Principally, respondent contends that we should create such an exemption because the statute does not expressly include property to be used for attorneys’ fees . . . In support, respondent observes that the legislative history is “silent” on this question, and that the House and Senate debates fail to discuss this prospect. But this proves nothing[.] The fact that the forfeiture provision reaches assets that could be used to pay attorney’s fees, even though it contains no express provisions to this effect, “‘does not demonstrate ambiguity'” in the statute: “‘It demonstrates breadth.'” Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985) (quoting Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d 384, 398 (CA7 1984)). The statutory provision at issue here is broad and unambiguous, and Congress’ failure to supplement § 853(a)’s comprehensive phrase — “any property” — with an exclamatory “and we even mean assets to be used to pay an attorney” does not lessen the force of the statute’s plain language.” 

“As we have noted before, such post-enactment views “form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent” behind a statute, United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960); instead, Congress’ intent is “best determined by [looking to] the statutory language that it chooses,” Sedima, S.P.R.L.supra, at 495, n.13. . . . Finally, respondent urges us, see Brief for Respondent 2029, to invoke a variety of general canons of statutory construction, as well as several prudential doctrines of this Court, to create the statutory exemption he advances; among these doctrines is our admonition that courts should construe statutes to avoid decision as to their constitutionality. See, e.g.Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988); NLRB. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 500 (1979). We respect these canons, and they are quite often useful in close cases, or when statutory language is ambiguousBut we have observed before that such “interpretative canon[s are] not a license for the judiciary to rewrite language enacted by the legislature.” United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 680 (1985). Here, the language is clear and the statute comprehensive: § 853 does not exempt assets to be used for attorney’s fees from its forfeiture provisions.” 

          The Supreme Court’s rulings are good enough for me when they’re based on all relevant evidence. Even more important for the purposes of § 83 is the fact that the government won these four cases arguing that the term “any” means everything unless the law expressly provides otherwise

          UP TO DATE – The US government has won in the U.S. Supreme Court on four occasions arguing that the statutory terms “any” and “any property” are all inclusive unless the law provides for an exclusion of something from the item or class of thing, property, or matter to which said term(s) applies. (See U.S. v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 607-611 and (syllabus) (1989); United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350, 357 (1994); U.S. v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 4-6 (1997); Department of Housing and Urban Renewal v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 130-31 (2002) citing Gonzalez and Monsanto). The IRS’ exclusion of the value of personal services from “the value of any money or property paid,” and from “cash or other property,” is arbitrary, a fortiori, it is impermissible. The Talmage court cited no such exception provided by law. This interpretation of “any” is universal. See decisions citing Gonzales, id. “any” is expansive and all inclusive: Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 228, 128 S.Ct. 831, 835-36 (2008); Ashland Hospital Corp. v. RLI Ins. Co., Civil #13-143-DLB-EBA (E.D. Kentucky, Northern Division, Ashland, March 17, 2015); Electronic Privacy Center v. U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security, 777 F.3d 518, 525 (CA Dist. Columbia February 10, 2015); Florida Health Sciences Center v. Sec. of U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Svcs., Civil #14-0791 (ABJ) (USDC of D.C. March 31, 2015); Florez v. Holder, U.S. Attorney General, Civil #14-874 (CA2 March 4, 2015); United States v. Kaluza, #14-30122 (CA5 March 11, 2015); United States v. Shill, 740 F.3d 1347, 1352 (CA9 January 14, 2014); United States v. Weisinger, #13-3655-cr (CA2 October 6, 2014); Arcia v. Florida Sec. of State, 746 F.3d 1273, 1281 (CA11 April 1, 2014); In re Bernard Madoff Investment Securities, LLC v. IDA Fishman Revocable Trust, #12-2557-bk(L) (CA2 December 8, 2014); Natural Resources Defense Council v. Environmental Protection Agency, 755 F.3d 1010, 1019 (CA D.C. June 27, 2014); WNET, et al. v. Aero, Inc., et al., 722 F.3d 500, 510 (CA2 July 16, 2013); PBBPC, Inc. v. OPK Biotech, LLC, 484 B.R. 860, 868 (Jan 17, 2013); Harkness v. United States, 727 F.3d 465, 471 (CA6 July 11,2013). 

“The determinative issue is therefore whether the phrase “any status” imposes an additional requirement that an alien must satisfy in addition to being admitted to the United States. We find no basis for so concluding. Although the word “status” is not defined in the INA, its general meaning is “[a] person’s legal condition.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1542 (10th ed. 2014); see also MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1220 (11th ed. 2007) (defining “status” as “the condition of a person or thing in the eyes of the law”). In conjunction, it is well settled that the word `any’ has an expansive meaning, that is, one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind.” Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 219 (2008) (quoting United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997)); see also HUD v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 131 (2002); United States v. Clayton, 613 F.3d 592, 596 (5th Cir. 2010); MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 56 (11th ed. 2007). The use of the word any to modify a term “suggests a broad meaning.” Ali, 552 U.S. at 218-19; see also Clayton, 613 F.3d at 596 (“The CCPA uses the modifier `any’ in describing the tax debts to which it applies, a term we must construe as `broad’ and `ha[ving] an expansive meaning.'” (quoting Ali, 552 U.S. at 219)). The Supreme Court has therefore explained that where, as here, Congress “did not add any language limiting the breadth of [the] word,” any must be read as referring to all” of the type to which it refersGonzales, 520 U.S. at 5; see also Merritt v. Dillard Paper Co., 120 F.3d 1181, 1186 (11th Cir. 1997). In other words, far from being further limiting, the word any is expansive.” 

See Rubio v. Lynch, US Attorney General, #14-60183 (CA5 May 21, 2015). And – 

“Specifically, Blixt tacitly relied on the so-called “general-terms canon” that holds that “[g]eneral terms are to be given their general meaning.” Scalia & Garnersupra, at 101 (boldface omitted). We agree with Blixt that, when Congress used the general term any” to modify the term name, it meant to give that term an “expansive meaningBlixt, 548 F.3d at 887; see, e.g.Nat’l Credit Union Admin. Bd. v. Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc., 727 F.3d 1246, 1267 (10th Cir.2013) (“Read naturally, the word `any’ has an expansive meaning….” (quoting Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 219, 128 S.Ct. 831, 169 L.Ed.2d 680 (2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted)), pet. for cert. filed, 82 U.S.L.W. 3307 (U.S. Nov. 8, 2013) (13-576);United States v. S. Half of Lot 7 & 8, Block 14, Kountze’s 3rd Addition to the City of Omaha, 910 F.2d 488, 489 (8th Cir.1990) (en banc) (“Congress’s use of the word `any’ to describe property `undercuts a narrow[er] construction.'” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 605, 106 S.Ct. 3116, 92 L.Ed.2d 483 (1986))).” 

See United States v. Porter, 745 F.3d 1035 (CA10 March 6, 2014). And – 

The terms “whoever” and “any are expansive. See, e.g., Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 566 U.S. ___, ___, 132 S.Ct. 2034, 2042, 182 L.Ed.2d 955 (2012) (explaining the term “any” “has an `expansive meaning,'” that “can broaden to the maximum, but never change in the least, the clear meaning of the phrase selected by Congress”) (quoting Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 131, 122 S.Ct. 1230, 152 L.Ed.2d 258 (2002)); United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5, 117 S.Ct. 1032, 137 L.Ed.2d 132 (1997) (“Read naturally, the word `any’ has an expansive meaning, that is, `one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind.'”) (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 97 (1976)); United States v. Lucien,347 F.3d 45, 51 (2d Cir.2003) (rejecting a defendant’s proposed construction of a statute that limited punishment for healthcare fraud to healthcare professionals because the statute applied to “whoever” committed such fraud and the common meaning of “whoever” was “whatever person, any person at all, no matter who”) (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2611 (1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Khatib, 706 F.2d 213, 218 (7th Cir.1983) (rejecting a defendant’s proposed status limitation on the term “whoever” in 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1) because the statutory language was not restrictive).” 

See United States v. Jungers, 702 F.3d 1066, 1070 (CA8 January 7, 2013). And – 

“The statute’s surrounding text also assists in interpreting the meaning of “real and personal property” as used in § 1521. The statute’s repetition of the indefinite determiner any signals an intended broad and expansive application of the statute. See United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997) (noting the word any has expansive meaning, one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind“). In § 1521, the word any modifies where an individual is prohibited from filing-in any public record or in any private record (which is generally available to the public). See 18 U.S.C. § 1521. “Any” also modifies what is prohibited.” 

See United States v. Neal, #12-10454 (CA9 January 12, 2015).

          It’s univeral – the term “any” means everything, any property means all property, any person means any person, unless the law provides for an exception or exclusion of some from the term to which “any” is to apply


What is your interpretation of Tax Code § 83(a)? 

26 USC § 83 Property transferred in connection with the performance of services
          (a) General rule.- If, in connection with the performance of services, property is transferred to any person other than the person for whom such services are performed, the excess of – 
          (1) the fair market value of such property (determined without regard to any restriction other than a restriction which by its terms will never lapse) at the first time the rights of the person having the beneficial interest in such property are transferable or are not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture, whichever occurs earlier, over – 
          (2) the amount (if any) paid for such propertyshall be included in the gross income of the person who performed such services in the first taxable year in which the rights of the person having the beneficial interest in such property are transferable or are not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture, whichever is applicable. The preceding sentence shall not apply if such person sells or otherwise disposes of such property in an arm’s length transaction before his rights in such property become transferable or not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture. 
26 USC § 83 Property Transferred in Connection with the Performance of ServicesIf, in connection with the performance of services property is transferred, . . . the excess of . . . the fair market value of such property . . . over . . . the amount (if any) paid for such property, . . . shall be included in the gross income of the person who performed such services . . . 

26 CFR 1.83-3(g) Amount paid. For purposes of section 83 and the regulations thereunder, the term “amount paid” refers to the value of any money or property paid for the transfer of property to which § 83 applies

*End authorities


          It doesn’t get any easier than this – one statute, one regulation, and all the case law in the world in support. You won’t find a single accountant or tax attorney who knows anything about § 83 and its relevance and importance. The only reason for they’re ignorance has to be that they never bothered to read the Tax Code, for if they had they surely would have come across § 83. Can anyone rightfully claim to be a tax expert when they haven’t even read the Tax Code? No. What business does anyone have suggesting that the Tax Code should be rewritten or simplified if they aren’t even aware of the statute that “explains how” to tax compensation? What if, like the PPACA, the Tax Code is complex for the purposes of hiding the true nature of the law? 

It is settled that when the law is vague or highly debatable, a defendant — actually or imputedly — lacks the requisite intent to violate it.”

(See US v. Critzer, 498 F.2d 1160, 1162 (CA4 1974). Accord, citing Critzer, see US v. Mallas, 762 F.2d 361 fn.4 (CA4 1985); US v. Cole, 631 F.3d 146, 151 (CA4 2011); US v. Danielczyk, 788 F.Supp.2d 472, 490 (E.D. Va. 2011); US v. Goland, 959 F.2d 1449, 1456 (dissent) (CA9 1992); US v. Clardy, 612 F.2d 1139, 1152 (CA9 1980); US v. Pirro, 212 F.3d 86, 91 (CA2 2000); US v. Garber, 607 F.2d 92, 98 (CA5 1979); US v. Heller, 830 F.2d 150, 154 (CA11 1987); US v. Schmidt, 935 F.2d 1440, 1448 (CA4 1991); US v. Diamond, 788 F.2d 1025, 1028 (CA4 1986); US v. Billie, 667 F.Supp. 1485, 1493 (USDC S.D. Florida 1987); US v. Lewis, 730 F.Supp. 691, 693 (USDC W.D. North Carolina 1990); US v. General Dynamics Corp., 644 F.Supp. 1497, 1500-01 (USDC C.D. Calif. 1986); US v. DeCastris, 798 F.2d 261, 267 (dissent) (CA7 1986); US v. Lewis, 649 F.Supp. 1109, 1111 (USDC W.D. Mich. 1986); US v. Baer, 662 F.Supp. 126, 130 (USDC W.D. New York 1987); US v. Masters, 730 F.Supp. 686, 690 (citing US v. Mallas, 762 F.2d 361 fn.4 (CA4 1985)) (USDC W.D. Charlotte Division, North Carolina 1990); US v. D’Alessio, 822 F.Supp. 1134, 1144 (USDC New Jersey 1993); Richmond Medical Center for Women v. Gilmore, 55 F.Supp.2d 441, 499 (USDC E.D. Richmond, Virginia 1999); US v. Dahlstrom, 713 F.2d 1423, 1428 (CA9 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 980, 104 S.Ct. 2363, 80 L.Ed.2d 835 (1984)). 
          I can’t get the government to place onto the record its own interpretation of § 83(a), no matter how antagonistic and confrontational I can get away with being in pleadings in federal tax cases. If you have an interpretation of § 83(a) that differs from my conclusion that it treats all property, including labor or personal services, as a cost, you’re a better tax lawyer than all those at the IRS and the DOJ, and all IRS employees who are “unfamiliar with § 83.” 

          What are the ramifications if the federal government is indeed depriving you and all Americans of the provisions of § 83 to steal the amounts it calls an income tax on the value of your personal services? Doesn’t this in fact make a felon of every official, agent, and employee of the federal government who’s involved in the enforcement of the Tax Code? Isn’t it true that the law from coast to coast allows any person with knowledge or reasonable suspicion that a felony has been committed to arrest the felon and take them to the authorities? Yes. Would you like a compilation of citizen’s arrest cases in federal courts from across America? Would you like a list of felony statutes the federal government violates through this misenforcement of the Tax Code? How did § 83(a) operate in the conclusion that you have gross income to report and to pay an income tax on when all you received was the fair market value of your personal services? Is what the IRS demands actually a “tax,” or is it extortion and racketeering? 
 ADD TO THIS the fact that Social Security is an income tax, and that § 83(a) applies to all compensation, which includes FICA wages and salaries in § 3121(a) (in Ch.21), and self employment earnings in Ch.2, which means that Social Security has never applied to the fair market value of personal services, AND it has never applied to Americans. 
 ALSO, § 83(a) applies to the salaries and wages paid to IRS employees, to all public servants. How did § 83(a) operate last year when they filed tax returns? That’s a good question. 
          Every dime, every year, for decades on end, nothing but extortion and racketeering; Americans have never owed the IRS anything. 

Watch as the gov’t skips over 83: 

        The Meltons maintain that they relied on federal case law and other materials to determine that they were not required to file federal income tax returns. They claim that they read a notice issued by the IRS which led them to the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. There, sections 6001 and 6011 explained that only “persons liable” must pay income taxes. The Meltons claim that, from Supreme Court cases and other documents, they learned that the income tax is an excise tax for which, as housepainters, they could not be held liable
        While courts may have offered differing views of the income tax over time, the United States Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the federal income tax for 80 years. Since 1916, the Court has construed the tax as an indirect tax authorized under Article I, Section 8, Clause I of the U.S. Constitution, as amended by the Sixteenth Amendment. See Brushaber v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 11, 16-19 (1916). Federal courts have all agreed that wages or compensation for services constitute income and that individuals receiving income are subject to the federal income tax – regardless of its nature. See, e.g., Brushaber, 240 U.S. at 17; United States v. Sloan, 939 F.2d 499, 500-01 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1060 (1992); Simmons v. United States, 308 F.2d 160, 167-68 (4th Cir. 1962). In short, the debate over whether the income tax is an excise tax or a direct tax is irrelevant to the obligation of citizens to pay taxes and file returns. Simmons, 308 F.2d at 166 n.21 (stating that “it has been clearly established that the labels used do not determine the extent of the taxing power”). 
        Furthermore, the duty to file returns and pay income taxes is clearSection 1 of the Internal Revenue Code imposes a federal tax on the taxable income of every individual. 26 U.S.C. § 1. Section 63 defines “taxable income” as gross income minus allowable deductions. 26 U.S.C. § 63. Section 61 states that “gross income means all income from whatever source derived,” including compensation for services. 26 U.S.C. § 61. Sections 6001 and 6011 provide that a person must keep records and file a tax return for any tax for which he is liable. 26 U.S.C. §§ 6001 & 6011. Finally, section 6012 provides that every individual having gross income that equals or exceeds the exemption amount in a taxable year shall file an income tax return. 26 U.S.C. § 6012. The duty to pay federal income taxes therefore is “manifest on the face of the statutes, without any resort to IRS rules, forms or regulations.” United States v. Bowers, 920 F.2d 220, 222 (4th Cir. 1990). The rarely recognized proposition that, “where the law is vague or highly debatable, a defendant – actually or imputedly – lacks the requisite intent to violate it,” Mallas, 762 F.2d at 363 (quoting United States v. Critzer, 498 F.2d 1160, 1162 (4th Cir. 1974)), simply does not apply here.” 

See US v. Melton, #94-5535 (CA4 May 22, 1996 Unpublished) (USDC #CR-93-34 W.D. North Carolina at Shelby). 


Is US Tax Court relevant? 

“…The logical force requiring rejection of their arguments-apart from their assertions of personal political philosophy which do not provide a basis for us, a Court sitting to interpret the law, to decide the questions dispositive of this case…” See Rowlee v. C.I.R., 80 USTC 1111, 1120 (1983), quoting Reading v. C.I.R., 70 TC 730 (1978), aff’d. 614 F.2d 159 (CA8 1980, at 173). 


“…the pleadings do not raise a genuine issue of material fact respecting Respondent’s determinations . . . but rather involve only issues of law. (Cite omitted) Therefore …. Respondent’s motion for judgment on the pleadings will be granted. . . . The final matter we consider is [penalties].” See Abrams v. C.I.R., 82 USTC 403, 408 (1984).




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